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Abstract
The protracted nature of conflicts in countries of the
global South means that return to home countries for
many refugees is increasingly delayed. At the same time,
global terrorism and concerns about security have slowed
processes of resettlement in countries of the North. Local
integration to host communities in countries of first asy-
lum may be a remaining option. This paper explores possi-
bilities for revival of local integration as a durable
solution. The authors situate the study within the frame-
work of protracted refugee situations globally and, specifi-
cally, within the existing local settlement structure and the
Self Reliance Strategy (SRS) in Uganda. Benefits to refu-
gee-hosting communities are analyzed through two case
studies: local integration through commerce and through
primary education. The paper concludes by exploring
ways in which stakeholders, including refugees, UNHCR,
and donor governments can work together to promote
shared and simultaneous development in refugee and na-
tional communities, specifically in conceptualizing the du-
rable solution of local integration within the context of a
national framework for development.
Résumé
Le fait que les conflits dans l’hémisphère Sud se prolon-
gent interminablement signifie que pour beaucoup de ré-
fugiés le retour dans leur pays d’origine est de plus en
plus retardé. En même temps, le terrorisme global et les
craintes sécuritaires ont considérablement ralenti les pro-
cédures de réinstallation dans les pays de l’hémisphère
Nord. Dans ces conditions, il semblerait que l’intégration
des réfugiés dans les communautés hôtes dans les pre-
miers pays d’asile pourrait être la seule solution possible.
Cet article examine donc les possibilités de raviver l’inté-
gration locale comme solution durable. Les auteurs pla-
cent leur étude dans le cadre des situations de réfugiés
qui se prolongent, et, plus particulièrement en référence à
la structure locale de réinstallation qui existe déjà en Ou-
ganda, ainsi que leur ‘Self Reliance Strategy’ (SRS)
(« stratégie autocentré »). Les avantages dont bénéficient
les communautés accueillant les réfugiés sont analysés à
travers deux études de cas : l’intégration locale à travers
le commerce et l’intégration à travers l’éducation primaire.
L’article conclut en examinant les manières par lesquelles
les parties prenantes, y compris les réfugiés, l’UNHCR et
les gouvernements donateurs, peuvent travailler de con-
cert pour promouvoir le développement parallèle et simul-
tané à la fois dans les communautés de réfugiés et dans
les communautés nationales – plus spécifiquement, en
conceptualisant la solution durable de l’intégration locale
dans le contexte d’un plan national de développement.
1. Introduction
P
olitical conflicts in various parts of the world are,
more and more often, of an extended duration. This
means that return to home countries for refugees is
increasingly delayed. At the same time, global terrorism and
concerns about security have slowed processes of resettle-
ment in traditional resettlement countries and, in some
cases, the number of refugees who can be resettled has fallen
and their countries of origin have been restricted. The in-
creasing size of refugee population influxes to countries of
first asylum has meant that host governments have been
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reluctant to facilitate local integration; indeed, local integra-
tion carries with it a connotation of permanence as well as
security problems and resource burdens.1 Failure to find
acceptable durable solutions among these three options has
resulted in increasing numbers of refugee situations world-
wide that can be described as “protracted.”
“Refugees can be regarded as being in a protracted situ-
ation when they have lived in exile for more than five years,
and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding
a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary
repatriation, local integration, or resettlement,”2 writes Jeff
Crisp. Due to the proliferation of situations that can be
described as such, the many stakeholders – including host
governments, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), local communities, and refugees – need
to come together to further explore the three possibilities for
durable solutions and their applicability in given situations.
By the end of 2001, it was estimated that some three
million refugees in Africa were in a protracted situation,3
the vast majority of them in Central and East Africa. The
long-term prospect for these refugees is becoming increas-
ingly bleak. In Africa and other parts of the global South, in
particular, governments have relied on material assistance
from the outside in responding to refugee situations.4 As a
result, the focus of refugee assistance has been about aid,
which is by nature a short-sighted endeavour.5 Over recent
years, donors and other international actors have focused
their attention increasingly either on high profile crises in
which there are  large flows of people or on large-scale
repatriation cases. As a result, “[p]rotracted situations,
which drag on for years and where there is no immediate
prospect of a durable solution for the refugees concerned,
have consequently been neglected.”6
The impact of this neglect has been felt directly by those
refugees who fall into this category. Tania Kaiser describes
the situation in Guinea, where reductions in food rations
are taking place not because there has been a corresponding
reduction in need, but because there is simply not enough
assistance to go around.7 Durable solutions for refugees –
particularly those in protracted situations – that do not
depend on continued emergency assistance are urgently
needed. Crisp writes:
…the presence of so many protracted refugee situations in
Africa can be linked to the fact that countries of asylum, donor
states, UNHCR, and other actors have given so little attention
to the solution of local integration during the past 15 years.
Indeed, from the mid-1980s onwards, a consensus was forged
around the notion that repatriation – normally but not neces-
sarily on a voluntary basis – was the only viable solution to
refugee problems in Africa and other low-income regions.8
Given the resulting continuation of protracted refugee situ-
ations, a reluctance in countries of the North to accept
greater numbers of refugees for resettlement, and the dwin-
dling assistance, it is imperative that local integration of
refugees be explored as a durable solution. Indeed, while
repatriation remains the final goal, local integration gives
refugees some certainty about what to do with their lives in
the meantime. Furthermore, local integration provides the
possibilities of harnessing development aid for the mutual
benefit of refugees and their hosts. In striving for sustainable
interventions, UNHCR and donor countries are left with little
option but to consider initiatives aimed at local integration.
This research explores local integration as a durable
approach to the protracted refugee situation in Uganda. In
Section 2, a framework for analysis of local integration is
presented. Section 3 situates the study within the existing
local settlement structure for refugees in Uganda and
within the Self Reliance Strategy (SRS), critiquing these
policies in the context of local integration. The perceived
resource burden that accompanies refugees is one of the
central factors that inhibits the adoption of policies that
promote local integration; Section 4 therefore addresses the
benefits to local communities of hosting refugees, through
the specific lenses of integration in primary education and
in commerce. In conclusion, Section 5 explores ways in
which stakeholders can work together to promote shared
and simultaneous development  in refugee and  national
communities, specifically in conceptualizing the durable
solution of local integration within the context of a national
framework for development, in this case the Poverty Eradi-
cation Action Plan (PEAP).
2. Local Integration as a Durable Solution
2.1. Local Integration: A Framework for Analysis
Rhetorically, integration has always been a guiding principle
of refugee programs in countries of the global South. Ac-
cording to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention,  restoring
refugees to dignity and ensuring the provision of human
rights includes an approach that would lead to their integra-
tion in the host society.9 Indeed the Convention uses the
word “assimilation,” which implies the disappearance of
differences between refugees and their hosts as well as per-
manence within the host society.10 Recent thinking, how-
ever, emphasizes both the importance of maintaining
individual identity11 and the possibility of “promoting self-
reliance pending voluntary return,”12 whereby local integra-
tion could be temporary.13
The possibility of integration of refugees and their hosts
is a question of concern for the international community
and host governments, especially in the context of pro-
tracted refugee situations. While the impact of refugees on
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host populations has been explored at a theoretical level,14
there has been little academic research on the costs and
benefits of refugee presence to host populations in a coun-
try-specific context.15 In addition, methods to quantify lev-
els of integration between refugee and host communities
are lacking in the literature. Indeed, disagreement over the
mere definition of the word “integration” in immigration
contexts worldwide, and specifically in refugee situations in
countries of first asylum, makes analysis of this topic diffi-
cult and has prevented adequate research.16
Barbara Harrell-Bond outlines  a simple  definition of
integration in a refugee context that is useful to employ as
a guide for the purposes of this discussion: “a situation in
which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist,
sharing the same resources – both economic and social –
with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists
within the host community.”17 Tom Kuhlman makes this
definition more explicit in outlining indices that can be
used to gauge refugee integration to a host community.
Among others, he identifies the following characteristics of
successful integration:
• the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to
maintain an identity of their own and to adjust psychologi-
cally to their new situation
• friction between host populations and refugees is not worse
than within the host population itself
• refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists
between groups previously settled within the host society.18
The economic and social factors of integration embodied in
these definitions of integration are crucial to the examina-
tion of policies that foster or prevent local integration. In-
deed, as will be demonstrated in the case of Uganda, often
the mere structural integration of services is seen as a sub-
stitute for the more complex process of local integration.
2.2. Local Integration in Countries of the Global South
In countries of the global South, areas that host refugees are
themselves plagued with poverty, characterized by a lack of
resources and infrastructure for social services and by cor-
responding difficulties in accessing economic markets. In
this context, analysis of the costs and benefits of local inte-
gration to host communities are critical in policy formation.
As Kibreab asks,
Given the severity of the economic crises and the environmental
degradation facing many of the major African refugee hosting
countries, the basic issue that emerges is, can these countries be
able or be expected to establish policies, legal frameworks and
institutions which could allow the absorption of hundreds of
thousands of refugees living within their territories into their
societies permanently?19
Kibreab then argues that in fact host governments in Africa
could not be expected to carry this burden, and he proposes
local settlement structures – spatially segregated sites that
could be supported by international donors – as the optimal
solution. Many countries, of which Uganda is one, have
adopted this strategy.
More recent literature, however, suggests that the bene-
fits to host communities of hosting refugees can outweigh
the costs, if structures are set up in such a way as to promote
joint development.20 This paper aims to contribute to this
body of literature through an examination of the benefits
of local integration to refugee-hosting communities, using
education and commerce as case studies.
3. Local Integration as a Durable Solution in
Uganda
While Uganda has historically dealt with numerous pro-
longed refugee situations, the previous decade has seen a
greater influx of refugees than at any time in the past. As of
December 2002, the UNHCR reported a national total of
197,082 refugees living in Uganda, primarily from Sudan,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda.21 It is
important to note, however, that this number represents the
refugees who are registered with UNHCR and who, almost
exclusively, live in settlement areas. In addition to this
number, conservative estimates place the number of self-set-
tled refugees in the country at approximately 50,000. In
reality, the number is probably far higher. Furthermore,
there are 10,000 refugees registered with the Office of the
Prime Minister as self-sufficient urban refugees22 and it is
estimated that 5,000 to 10,000 others live in Kampala with-
out assistance or protection.23
Uganda provides a unique context for the investigation
of local integration as a durable solution.24 It has a long
history as both a generator of refugees and a host country
for refugees,25 and the integration of refugees into Ugandan
society has been a common occurrence. As Abraham Kiapi
writes, “[u]nless in the case of influx, refugees are, in prac-
tice, integrated into Ugandan society. They have been of-
fered employment, including joining the police force and
even the army.”26 While social, economic, and cultural
integration of refugees to Uganda has successfully occurred
in the past, the difficulty of political integration has been a
common factor in all cases.27 Indeed, the legal structures of
Uganda have shaped, and continue to shape, the possibili-
ties for local integration in this country.
3.1 The Impact of Legal Structures on Local Integration
The current legislation relating to refugees in Uganda is the
outdated Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA). Enacted in
1960, eighteen years before Uganda ratified the 1951 Refugee
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Convention, the CARA is inconsistent with international
standards relating to the treatment of refugees. As its title
implies, the act focuses on the control of refugees. Although
the Act has never been strictly applied in Uganda,28 this
emphasis has had an impact on how refugees are treated. It
regulates, for instance, the way in which assistance is delivered
to refugees: aid is contingent upon a refugee living in a desig-
nated settlement, all of which are located in rural and isolated
areas of Uganda. The only exception to this regulation is the
180 refugees29 who are recognized on UNHCR’s urban
caseload.30
In addition to those refugees who have been officially
recognized by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the
UNHCR and are living in settlements, there are tens of
thousands31 more who do not live in settlements. They have
opted out of the assistance structures and, instead, have
self-settled among the Ugandan population. While “offi-
cial” refugees fall under the control of the national govern-
ment structures (through the Directorate of Refugees,
Office of the Prime Minister), self-settled refugees tend to
operate within the local government structures, both rural
and urban. They are integrated into their host community,
pay graduated tax, contribute to the local economy, and
even run in local council elections.32 However, their legal
status remains insecure and ambiguous: they fall within the
category of prima facie refugees, but are in danger of being
seen as illegal immigrants.
3.2 Local Settlement Structure for Refugees in Uganda
As stated above, Uganda historically has hosted refugees in
local settlements. In northern Uganda, the local settlement
program for Sudanese refugees started in 1992, when land
was made available for agricultural production.33 Settle-
ments are large, isolated areas of land located in rural areas
of Uganda, the greatest concentration being in the north-
western region. These settlements are, in theory, supposed
to offer a more permanent departure from the temporary
“transit camp.”34 Policy makers state that the original ob-
jective of the local settlement  policy was to promote a
degree of self-sufficiency for refugees.35 In real terms, this
has  meant  little more than  making  small plots  of  land
available for the refugees to use, within the geographical
confines of the settlement.36 However, the location of the
settlements, the lack of sufficient arable land, and the gen-
eral insecurity that has characterized northern Uganda for
decades have compromised attempts at self-sufficiency in
most cases.37
Self-sufficiency has been further  hindered by  lack  of
freedom of movement, imposing restrictions that conspire
against refugees becoming economically and socially inde-
pendent. In order to leave the settlement in which they
reside, refugees must obtain a permit issued by the Settle-
ment Commandant, which is a time-consuming and un-
predictable process. A recent study in Kyangwali
settlement, western Uganda, showed the extent to which
self-sufficiency is compromised by restrictions on move-
ment – as well as corresponding limitations on employment
– which exclude refugees from basic interaction with exter-
nal goods and labour markets.38 Likewise in Moyo settle-
ment, refugees are isolated not only as a result of the
bureaucratic restrictions placed on them, but by the fact that
they often do not have the resources to travel the large dis-
tances between the settlements and surrounding markets.39
As well as creating economic isolation, the settlement
structure also generates social seclusion. The physical sepa-
ration between refugees and nationals creates an environ-
ment conducive to tensions between the two groups. For
instance Ugandan nationals often perceive refugees as be-
ing better off than they are, as they witness World Food
Programme  (WFP) trucks moving into the settlements.
They are also seen as a source of potential competition over
scarce resources such as firewood and boreholes.40 This is
due, in part, to the fact that districts within which settle-
ments are located are themselves underserved and margi-
nalized. In addition, although services such  as primary
schools that have been created for refugees are, in theory,
shared with the surrounding national population, there has
been a lack of coordination between refugee assistance
structures and the wider district development structures,
creating inefficiency and exacerbating tensions.
3.3 Self-Reliance Strategy
By the late 1990s, policy makers were increasingly looking
for a more sustainable solution to the protracted refugee
situation in Uganda. At the same time, the need to operate
in coordination with the wider service-delivery structure of
Uganda “to optimize [sic] the use of resources for the good
of both refugees and the host community”41 was being rec-
ognized. The result was the creation of the Self Reliance
Strategy (SRS).
The SRS was jointly designed by the Office of the Prime
Minister (OPM) and UNHCR Uganda in May 1999, the
culmination of a process that officially began in 1998. It was
conceptualized specifically for Sudanese refugees living in
the West Nile districts of Arua, Adjumani, and Moyo,
recognizing the long-term nature of their situation.42 Its
overarching  goal,  as stated, is  “to integrate  the services
provided to the refugees into regular government struc-
tures and policies”43 and, in so doing, to move “from relief
to development.”44 As Dorothy Jobolingo, Education Advi-
sor to UNHCR Uganda states, “[w]e cannot treat it as a
relief situation where we give them something to eat every
Local Integration of Refugees and Their Hosts in the Case of Uganda

day. That is not a durable solution….... The SRS is not
theory. It is a practical solution.”45
In order to bring about a change from relief to develop-
ment, the SRS emphasizes the dual objectives of empower-
ment and integration, in order “to improve the standard of
living of the people in Moyo, Arua and Adjumani districts,
including the refugees.”46 It seeks to give refugees the ability
“to stand on their own and build their self-esteem” through
gaining skills and knowledge to both take back to their
home countries when they  return, and to leave behind
sustainable structures.47 At the time it was written, it was
envisaged that, by 2003, refugees would be able to grow or
buy their own food, access and pay for basic services, and
maintain self-sustaining community structures. The SRS
was designed to be implemented at a district level, with
OPM and UNHCR playing coordinating roles, and “[en-
suring] harmonisation of policy.”48
In order to “empower refugees and nationals…to the
extent that they will be able to support themselves,”49 the
SRS outlines the integration of service delivery in the
sectors of agricultural production, income generation,
community services, health and nutrition, education,
water and sanitation, the environment, and infrastructure
development. In this way, it addresses one flaw of the local
settlement policy, that of parallel service delivery. It does
not, however, address many of the other shortcomings.
Indeed, it  embraces one of the fundamental problems
with traditional development: it attempts to substitute the
provision of services for sustainable development based
on economic growth.50
3.4. Self-Reliance in the Context of the Local Settlement
Structure
While the SRS provides a framework for addressing the
protracted refugee situation in Uganda, it contains funda-
mental flaws. The policy itself acknowledges that the success
of the SRS is contingent upon two factors: first, that the SRS
should be implemented under a new Refugee Bill that ad-
dresses such issues as freedom of movement, taxation, trade
and employment opportunities, and temporary access to
land; second, that it should operate in an environment that
is secure from armed conflict.51 To date, neither of these
factors has been resolved: Uganda has, thus far, failed to pass
new refugee legislation, and refugees and surrounding popu-
lations continue to be attacked by rebel groups, most notably
the Lords Resistance Army (LRA).52 In addition to these two
factors, the SRS also acknowledges the marginalization of
the West Nile region as being a further limiting factor.
While the SRS acknowledges these factors, there are
other flaws within it that have not been taken into consid-
eration. In particular, the SRS advocates self-reliance with-
out local integration. Integration, as defined by the SRS, is
based primarily on the coordination of services; it does not
present social and economic integration as a necessity in
such a process. By divorcing the two areas – integration of
services and social integration – rather than acknowledging
that they are mutually dependent, the SRS ensures that it
cannot bring about self-reliance. Furthermore, while the
word “communities” in the SRS document is used to refer
to refugees and hosts collectively – reflecting an emphasis
on a “community-based” approach – the term, in reality,
refers to two geographically isolated groups. The notion of
“community” in this context is anathema.
While the SRS expresses similarities between refugees
and hosts in terms of cultural background and refers to
their common experience of refugeehood, it keeps them
physically segregated through the local settlement struc-
ture. The concept of full integration – in other words the
abolishment of the settlement structure – is left hanging:
“Finally, the  freedom of  movement for refugees within
Uganda should be as broad as possible, although a reason-
able system of control should not be rejected out of hand.”53
Thus, as with the local settlement structure, the sticking
point continues to be the issue of freedom of movement;54
the SRS attempts to propagate a free-market economy,
whereby self-reliance could be achieved, but within a com-
mand economy framework. As illustrated below, the impact
of these restrictions on commercial activity is just one example
of the limitations imposed by such a contradictory approach.
In addition, the SRS refers only to refugees who are in
the official assistance structures, and makes no more than
a passing statistical reference to the many self-settled refu-
gees living in Uganda. This is a serious omission for two
reasons. First, it fails to reflect the refugee population in its
entirety. Second, and most importantly, it misses the op-
portunity to learn from refugees who have, themselves,
gone some way towards reaching the dual goals of empow-
erment and integration laid out in the SRS, not least
through commercial enterprise and participating in local
labour markets.
3.5. Implementation of the Self-Reliance Strategy
The time frame for implementing the SRS, as outlined in
the original Strategy Paper published in May 1999, was
ambitious. It envisioned a four-year implementation proc-
ess,  with “[t]he last two  years  of the  strategy…used to
consolidate the structures and systems established in the
first two years.”55 The one specific benchmark stated was
that “[f]ree food distribution will be ended by July 2001,”56
as the first real step in self-sufficiency. Despite these plans,
the implementation of the SRS has been slow and disorgan-
ized.
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Problems associated with the implementation of the
SRS have a number of origins. First, the Refugee Bill that
was expected to be passed into law by 2001 at the latest57
still remains in Parliament where is has just received its first
reading. Second, the reluctance of donors to include refu-
gees in district development plans has constrained plans for
implementing the SRS effectively.58 Indeed, development
aid to Ugandan nationals and international assistance to
refugees continue to be separate and parallel processes.
Third, and most importantly, administrative failure and
lack of communication have consistently led to delays and
misunderstandings in the implementation process. There
is disagreement, in fact, over when the implementation of
the SRS actually began. A UNHCR representative cites a
2001 start date, when money started to change over to
district levels.59 An official from the Office of the Prime
Minister is explicit that it was not until January 2002 that
the SRS took effect.60 District Education Officers and
Camp Commandants outside of the West Nile region do not
know if the SRS has yet taken effect in their areas and if they
are responsible for implementing it.61 What is clear, how-
ever, is that implementation of the SRS has not gone accord-
ing to plan.
In the sphere of education, it was not until February of
2001 that a workshop was convened to “start looking at the
possibilities for integration from a technical point of view
and to aim at the hand over of education service delivery
from Implementing Partners (IP’s) to local governments in
the most efficient way.”62 Education was not the first sector
to be integrated. Indeed, a similar delay was experienced in
other sectors and, more importantly, processes of “sensi-
tis[ing] communities (Nationals/Refugees) in districts on
integration,”63 a process that the designers of the SRS indi-
cated would be crucial to the SRS implementation from the
outset,64 had not yet begun by February 2001.65 This sensi-
tizing and coordination of stakeholders is a problem that
persists to the present. The only person at the Ministry of
Education and Sports with even partial responsibility for
refugee education says, “[t]here is very little written com-
munication. We go to these [refugee-hosting] schools, we
see libraries and classrooms, organisations have given
physical cash. But there is no written communication about
what they are doing to their schools. So that limits knowl-
edge.”66 It also limits the possibilities for a true integration
of services, let alone of communities.
3.6. Review and Evaluation of the Self-Reliance Strategy
The UNHCR and the Government of Uganda had planned
a review and evaluation of the SRS during the year 2002. Due
to ongoing violence in the West Nile region, however, the
lives of refugees have been severely disrupted. Linnie Kes-
selly of UNHCR Uganda explains that while refugees in
Adjumani, for example, had become self-sufficient in terms
of food production, the upheavals of recent attacks and
violence have caused refugees to flee their fields and become
once again dependent on direct assistance. An evaluation in
this context would not be productive, she said.67
An exhaustive critique of the Self Reliance Strategy is
outside the scope of this paper. As outlined above, however,
critical aspects of the process of integration have been
overlooked both in the formation of the SRS policy and in
its implementation. As a result, the possibilities for local
integration as a durable solution are not being fully ex-
plored at a policy level, within the Ugandan context. Indeed,
the Self Reliance Strategy has been conceived and operation-
alized in isolation from direct experiences with the process of
integration of refugee and national communities.
4. Benefits to Host Communities in the Case
of Local Integration
In this section, the paper seeks to illuminate some of the
factors that are essential to successful local integration of
refugees in Uganda through two case studies. The first case
study examines refugee engagement in commerce from both
within the settlement structure and in a self-settled context.
This engagement does not take place according to a planned
policy but is rather a strategy spontaneously employed by
both refugees and nationals as a means of sustaining liveli-
hoods. The second case study analyzes the service-delivery
aspect of primary education as well as the day-to-day reali-
ties of social integration through teaching and learning. This
social integration takes place both as part of a planned policy
and through self-directed local efforts to provide quality
education, often seen as “the key to the future.”68
The two case studies have been chosen to demonstrate
the limitations of local integration within the current Ugan-
dan context and to explore and outline the possibilities for
success. They examine situations in which the social inte-
gration of refugees and hosts takes place at different levels
to provide important models both of the processes of social
integration under differing conditions and the benefits to
refugees and their hosts of such integration. It is work that
the authors believe should have been undertaken in the
process of development of the SRS and that we believe to
be a necessary framework for an urgently needed review
and evaluation of the SRS in particular and of local integra-
tion as a general principle.
4.1. Economic Integration through Commerce in
Moyo District
Commerce is a sector that is fundamentally linked to issues
of self-reliance and integration, and illustrates many of the
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issues outlined above. Field research in Moyo district in the
West Nile region of Uganda69 provides a telling example of
the interaction between commerce and integration. Moyo
district lies in Uganda’s West Nile region, with the White
Nile along the southern border flowing to the northeast, and
the border with Sudan to the north. Moyo town is the admin-
istrative headquarters for the district and lies fifteen kilometres
south of the border with Sudan. The district is in a semi-arid
area and has experienced increasingly sporadic rainfall since
1998, creating a harsh agricultural environmentand lowstand-
ards of living. It is also host to approximately 23,000 registered
refugees living in the Palorinya Refugee Settlement cluster, and
an unknown number of self-settled refugees living throughout
the district, but with greater concentration in Moyo town and
along the Sudan border. Within the settlements, the SRS has
been partially implemented, and some refugees are no longer
receiving any assistance.
Through interviews with a cross-section of settlement
and self-settled refugees, as well as nationals and officials
living in the district, there was an observable difference
between the economic activities of settlement refugees and
those of self-settled refugees. At one level this is inevitable:
self-settled refugees,  having  opted out  of the assistance
structures, are forced to find alternative means of survival.
However, the difference appeared to go deeper than neces-
sity, and related to the wider socio-political context. Indeed,
the function of commerce within this context is tied inex-
tricably to issues surrounding policies on refugee protec-
tion, specifically the emphasis on the settlement policy.
Settlements, which are, by their very nature, closed
spaces, place serious limitations on commercial activity.
For any commercial venture to succeed, goods need to
move, and people need to trade and move to places where
commercial returns are optimal. In other words, for settle-
ment refugees to engage in commercial activity with any
degree of success, they need to be able to leave the settle-
ment with their produce and find a suitable market. Fur-
thermore, they need to be able to do this without
jeopardizing their status as refugees. However, our findings
indicate that the restrictions placed on settlement refugees
are preventing this from happening at any commercially
viable level. Eric Werker, in a study carried out in Kyangwali
settlement in western Uganda, highlights three restrictions
placed on the economic freedoms of refugees: bureaucratic
and insecurity-related limitations on movement that pre-
vent refugees from moving in and out of the settlement
freely, limitations on working that effectively exclude refu-
gees from external labour markets, and the lack of transport
and information flows to and from the settlement.70 The
same restrictions apply directly to Palorinya settlement:
with the presupposition for effective commerce being
linked to movement, the fact that settlement refugees have
their movement so seriously restricted means that they are
unable to move freely to markets. Furthermore, should they
wish to, they are unable to move to another location where
there might be better markets and a wider job market and
where their skills are in greater demand.
This lack of ability to carry out commercial activity is
accentuated by the fact that many settlement refugees –
both those under the SRS and those who are receiving full
assistance – showed both a desire and a need to generate
additional income. For instance, the most common com-
plaint made by the settlement refugees was that they were
unable to generate the funds to send their children to
secondary school. While primary education is free, refugees
and nationals alike have to pay for secondary education, a
demand that is all but impossible for settlement refugees
who are unable to generate additional income. Further-
more, the lack of economic opportunity has created an
environment of helplessness and dependency – well-docu-
mented throughout the literature – that further conspires
against what little available commercial activity there is in
such a closed, harsh environment.
Self-settled refugees, on the other hand, presented an
alternative, even diametrically opposed, picture of com-
mercial activity. These refugees had deliberately opted out
of the settlement structure, often  because they saw  the
commercial advantages of doing so, even though it meant
they did not receive basic allocations of food, non-food
items, and land. Instead of receiving handouts or trying to
farm small parcels of inadequate land, they were engaging
in a wide variety of commercial activities throughout the
district. One young boy talked of how he went into Sudan
during the mango season to pick mangoes that he would
then sell in local markets within Moyo. By doing this, he
generated enough income to pay his school fees.71
While this  example  clearly  contravenes tidy, interna-
tional standards, it is pertinent to note that his activities
were taking place with the endorsement of local govern-
ment officials. Interviews with such officials showed the
extent to which they recognized the advantages of allowing
refugees to interact freely within the economic activities of
the district, not least because it has widened their tax base
and increased local revenue. While there was a clear proviso
that refugees had to follow the rules that applied through-
out the district, local government officials showed the ex-
tent to which they had recognised the potential benefits of
allowing refugees to engage freely in commercial activity.
However, while the outlook for many self-settled refu-
gees was positive, particularly in contrast to the dependence
and helplessness of settlement refugees, it is important not
to over-romanticize their situation. Indeed, for many, life
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was a daily challenge of survival in a difficult environment,
exacerbated by a national policy that prevents self-settled
refugees from receiving any additional help outside of the
settlement. Furthermore, interviews revealed three poten-
tial pitfalls that need to be kept in mind. First, when refugees
have become successful in business, politicians have been
known to draw attention to disparities between refugees
and nationals, thus generating xenophobia. Second, a
number of refugees were perceived by nationals to have
abused their commercial success with similar results. Fi-
nally, when rains fail or the local economy takes a down-
turn, it is often the refugees who are first to suffer though
loss of jobs and increased vulnerability.
Even acknowledging such considerations, it is clear that
commercial activity offers a gateway for local integration to
take place – not only in allowing refugees to carry out
activities with which they are familiar and to improve their
standard of living, but also in benefiting the host commu-
nities through increased economic activity and local reve-
nue. However, the basic requirement of commercial
activity is freedom of movement and choice. Even with the
implementation of the SRS, which is supposed to encourage
refugees to take more responsibility for their own lives, the
limitations on their freedom of movement continually con-
spire against commercial enterprise. There is thus stagna-
tion within the settlements. Despite the many difficulties
they also face, the self-settled refugees show a clear alterna-
tive that allows for creativity and self-respect. Furthermore,
the fact that self-settled refugees are operating within the
local government structures gives their commercial activi-
ties security and sustainability.
4.2. Social Integration through Primary Education in
Kyenjojo District
While the issues of freedom of movement and integration
of refugees and nationals through commerce are skirted by
the SRS, education is a sector that is explicitly addressed in
the design and implementation of the SRS policy. In particu-
lar,  the  SRS advocates  “integrating refugee primary and
secondary schools into the district education system.”72 In
so doing, the SRS aims to develop “mechanisms for the
inclusion of the refugees into the Universal Primary Educa-
tion (UPE) being implemented in Uganda”73 and to ensure
that “the conditional grants provided to the districts for
UPE…be increased to include refugees.”74 Under this sys-
tem, schools would receive an allocation of UPE funds from
the Ugandan government for all pupils, regardless of
whether they are refugees or nationals, in addition to funds
provided by the UNHCR designed to specifically target
refugee education. In this way, both service-delivery and
funding for education of nationals and refugees is to be
coordinated. Not all refugee-hosting schools in Uganda,
however, are included in these initiatives of the SRS.
In the sphere of education, the case is considered of a
refugee-hosting area, Kyenjojo District, in which both the
integration of services  and  social integration are taking
place. The site is not one of those included in the SRS; the
integration occurs simply through coordination between
district officials and UNHCR and its implementing part-
ners. While this site is located within the local settlement
structure, it is a settlement that is secure, where there is
greater freedom of movement than in other places, and
where there is open economic interaction between refugees
and nationals. This case seems to have been overlooked in
the development of the SRS and yet it holds important
lessons in the search for models of local integration for
refugees in Uganda.
Kyaka II Refugee Settlement is located in Kyenjojo Dis-
trict in Western Uganda on eighty-one square kilometres
of land,75 approximately seventy kilometres by road from
the town of Mubende. At the end of December 2002, 3,159
refugees were living in Kyaka II, including 1,905 Rwandese,
1,242 Congolese, and 12 Kenyans. Fifty per cent of the
refugees are male, 50 are female.76 The Kyaka area first
hosted refugees in the 1950s following the political turmoil
in Rwanda that led to the flight of thousands of Batutsi into
Uganda.77 Kyaka II was created as a settlement to host these
refugees in 1959, and many of them stayed until 1994 when
it became safe to return to Rwanda.78 Since 1994, Kyaka II
has hosted primarily Congolese refugees and Rwandese of
Bahutu origin.
Although Kyaka II refugee settlement was not included in
the conceptualization of the SRS, the abundance of land and
the stability of surrounding national communities have been
conducive to the integration of services in this settlement.
Indeed, it meets the conditions for successfully establishing
self-reliant communities, as outlined in the SRS. While
schools in Kyaka II have received and continue to receive
assistance from UNHCR, “they are like any other schools
because to us those schools are also government schools.”79
Indeed, refugee pupils are counted in the overall population
of a school, and UPE funds are granted on the basis of those
numbers;80 UNHCR supplements the amount the school
receives with school fees paid for each refugee child.81 As
the District Education Officer (DEO) for Kyenjojo says, “I
grew up and found that these people are studying to-
gether…. [T]here is no way you can say that refugees go
there [points one direction] and those who are not refugees
go there [points in the other direction]…. [T]he goal is to
have the child educated. So we don’t separate them.”82
Bujubuli Primary School opened in 1984 and has, since
that time, served both the refugees and the nationals who
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have made their home in the area. In April 2003, there were
160 refugee and 177 national pupils at this school. A sense
of co-operation among pupils and teachers pervades the
school. The school feels peaceful; it does not feel like a conflict
or displacement situation. It is located far from insecure
borders and there is enough land for people to grow their own
food. It is a stable place for refugee children.83
The social integration of pupils at Bujubuli Primary
School is obvious. On a symbolic level, this integration is
demonstrated by the two flags that fly in front of the school:
the Ugandan national flag and the flag of the Batooro
people.84 At afternoon parades, the children sing the Ugan-
dan anthem, the Ugandan school anthem, and the anthem
of the Toro Kingdom. There is a sense that all of the children
of the school are “young women and men of Uganda…
uniting for a better Uganda.”85 Further, there is not a sense
of children being asked to give up their identities as Rwan-
dese or Congolese; but there is a sense of equal belonging.
On an individual level, refugee and national pupils model
social integration as they do not all sit together in groups
but mix in class, by their own choice.86
The majority of pupils at Bujubuli are nationals. Al-
though the school was originally built by UNHCR with the
aim of providing education for refugees, the nationals who
make their home in the area have also benefited. First,
children state in interviews that if Bujubuli Primary School
were not there, they would have to walk many kilometres
to go to the nearest school and may, in fact, not attend
school.87 In this way, access to primary education for na-
tionals is augmented by the presence of refugees. Second,
Bujubuli feels more stable than other schools due to the
continued presence, aid, and supervision of both UNHCR
– and its implementing partner, Office of the Prime Minis-
ter (OPM) – and district education officials, which is a
benefit to refugees and nationals alike.88 Third, the infra-
structure that has developed with the financial support of
both of these stakeholders is more substantial than in
neighbouring schools and thus promotes the standard of
education for both refugees and nationals. Fourth, the
teaching force of the school is almost entirely national, with
only one refugee teacher. These nationals are paid both by
the Ministry of Education and Sport (Government of
Uganda) and the UNHCR, through OPM. The presence of
refugees in this area thus increases opportunities for em-
ployment of local teachers. Lastly, due to the population of
refugee pupils, teachers are hired both by the MOES and
OPM, resulting in a greater number of teachers than would
otherwise be posted at the  school. The lower pupil-to-
teacher ratios allow for greater interaction between pupils
and teachers, more frequent marking of books, and in-
creased class participation by individual pupils,89 thus serv-
ing to increase the quality of education available in this area
of Uganda.
5. Conclusions: Local Integration within a
Model of Development
The case studies of commerce and education in Uganda
demonstrate the need for policies, and their implementa-
tion, that strive for joint development among refugees and
their hosts. In this context, the simple integration of services
cannot be substituted for careful planning, coordination,
and monitoring of the social and economic integration of
these communities. In order to achieve benefits for both
refugees and hosts, conceptualizing local integration
through a model of development is essential.
5.1 A Framework for Development: The Poverty
Elimination Action Plan (PEAP)
The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is the frame-
work that guides development for Ugandan nationals in
Uganda. It articulates a national vision to eradicate mass
poverty in Uganda by 2017. Specifically, the goal is to reduce
the number of people living below the poverty line to 10 per
cent by that time – from 56 per cent in 1992–93, and 35 per
cent in 2000.90 Since its inception in 1997, it has guided the
formulation of government policy as well as the direction of
international aid. Indeed, the PEAP is the overarching na-
tional planning document of the Government of Uganda
and clearly places poverty eradication as the fundamental
goal of the Government.91
As put forth through this document, development is
measured by the eradication of poverty that, it argues, will
only be possible with economic growth. From these basic
assumptions stem the four major, and interrelated, goals of
the PEAP: first, rapid and sustainable economic growth and
structural transformation; second, good governance and
security; third, increased ability of the poor to raise their
incomes; and last, increased quality of life of the poor.92
Goal 1 expresses the need for large-scale economic
growth as a means to eradicate poverty; this growth, while
it aims to be rapid, also needs to be sustainable. The PEAP
simultaneously advocates for structural transformation
within the Ugandan economy, specifically in the context of
agriculture. Indeed, the basis of poverty in Uganda is the
“poor economy where most people are locked into tradi-
tional subsistence agriculture.”93 Importantly, however, the
PEAP asserts that the transformation of the economy from
agriculture to non-agricultural sectors must happen
through the modernization of agriculture and not by its
abandonment.
Goal 2 underlines the essential conditions that must be
present for development to occur: good governance and
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security. When consulted, ordinary citizens “see a definite
and direct link between insecurity and poverty levels. For
example they say whole regions (North East and Karamoja)
have lagged behind in terms of development largely due to
prolonged insecurity.94 Development simply cannot hap-
pen without security of person and property.
Goal 3 is the projected outcome of the economic growth
described above: an increase in the ability of the poor to
raise their incomes. In order for people to raise their in-
comes, development strategies need to find ways that the
poor can participate in economic growth. It is only through
this participation that they can benefit. The idea of the
PEAP, and the thrust of Goal 3, is not that the rural poor
serve as beneficiaries of the country’s economic growth but
that they are engaged in that growth.
Goal 4 is the anticipated result of the previous three
goals. The aim is that with economic growth and the ability
of the poor to raise their incomes, the poor will experience
enhanced quality of life. Although increased quality of life
is dependent on greater access to services such as education
and health care, the PEAP is clear that, alone, provision of
services is not development. It presents the role of provision
of these public services only as a subsidiary to the economic
growth that comes with individual freedoms and develop-
ment of human agency. Creating the environment in which
individuals can ensure their own access to services, it argues,
is more important than the direct provision of those services.
At its most fundamental level, the PEAP represents a
blueprint for long-term national development within the
context of a stable environment. It recognizes the need for
security, and underscores the extent to which the provision
of services is not, in itself, development.95 The creation of
local integration of refugees as a durable solution – a move
from relief to development – as outlined in the SRS, needs
to take place within the framework created by the PEAP for
development in Uganda.
5.2 Towards Local Integration of Refugees in Uganda
Assistance to refugees in Uganda needs to be considered in
the light of the PEAP. The question that needs to be asked
is, how does development – as set out in the PEAP – occur
in the context of the local settlement structure? The local
settlement structure and the PEAP present two parallel and
uncoordinated assistance/development structures – one for
refugees and the other for Ugandan nationals. Perhaps the
question is then better phrased as, can development occur
in the context of a local settlement structure? Self-sufficiency
and local integration operate in a symbiotic relationship.
Economically, politically, and socially, it is not possible to
have one without the other. The SRS system proposes har-
mony through the integration of services, yet it lays the
foundation for antagonism by maintaining notions of “oth-
erness” inherent in the settlement structure.
As evident in the case studies of commerce and educa-
tion, Ugandan policy needs to shift in order to realize the
full mutual benefits of local integration for refugees and
their hosts. While this responsibility rests with the host
government, the international community, especially an
active donor community, has a fundamental role to play.
Indeed, the great reluctance of host governments such as
Uganda to adopt policies that could promote the self-reli-
ance of refugees rests in the perceived lack of economic
viability of this possibility. Specifically, within the confines
of a settlement structure, international assistance targeted
to refugees can be easily channelled to that purpose; con-
versely, and importantly, development aid targeted to na-
tional populations reaches national populations and does
not become diluted by an additional refugee population. In
a country of extreme poverty and lack of infrastructure and
in which development aid accounts for 52 per cent of the
operating budget, the possibility of losing international aid
to refugees through an integrated approach is perhaps a risk
not worth taking. Until the point at which donors include
refugees in development plans and fund district plans ac-
cordingly, there will be a continued disincentive for a
change in Ugandan refugee policy.
Joint development of refugees and their hosts through a
model of local integration is a remaining hope for durable
solutions. Indeed, it may be the only remaining option for
most of the world’s refugees, as possibilities for repatriation
and resettlement become slim in areas of protracted conflict
and tightening of borders in countries of the North. As
demonstrated in this paper, however, local integration need
not be conceived of as a fallback option, but instead as a
positive step in securing long-term stability for both refu-
gees and host communities.
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